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ABSTRACT 
People differ in their ability to produce health investments and in their capacity to benefit 
from such efforts. In this paper, we assume (1) that the individual’s health-investment 
production function exhibits diminishing returns to scale and (2) that the individual’s 
capacity to benefit from the investments is diminishing in the stock of health. Previous 
research has only shown the importance of the first assumption for the health-capital 
adjustment process. The simultaneous effects go well beyond those results, however. 
Thus, this paper provides an extended demand-for-health framework that distinguishes 
between individuals both by their capacities to benefit and by their abilities to produce, 
when transforming health efforts into health increments. The potential usefulness of this 
framework for health-policy purposes is demonstrated by solving a numerically specified 
version of the model, and computing individual welfare effects of medical-care goods 
changes.  
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1. Introduction 
An individual’s efforts to transform time and other resources into health may 
conceptually be divided into two parts: (1) his or her ability to transform time and other 
resources into gross health investments and (2) his or her capacity to benefit from the 
investment, i.e., to transform the investment into changes in health status. Since the two 
processes may have quite different properties, it is an important conceptual distinction to 
make. So far, it does not seem to have been recognised or explored in the health-
economics literature in general or within the demand-for-health (or individual-as-
producer-of-health) theoretical framework in particular. 
 
Moreover, in previous treatments, including Grossman’s original model (Grossman, 
1972a, b) and several later extensions (for instance, Dardanoni and Wagstaff, 1987, 1990; 
Selden, 1993; Chang, 1996; Liljas, 2000; Jacobson, 2000; Bolin et al., 2001a, 2002b; 
2002c; Galama and Kapteyn, 2011; and Bolin and Lindgren, 2012), it was further 
assumed that the marginal cost of producing health capital from own time and other 
resources is constant. Exceptions are Liljas (1998), introducing a decreasing marginal cost 
function by assuming that the depreciation of health is negatively dependent on the stock 
of health capital, and Galama (2011), assuming decreasing returns to scale. 
 
Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) claimed that the assumption of a linear homogenous health 
production process generally implies that no interior equilibrium would exist in the 
demand-for-health model and that a ”bang-bang” equilibrium would follow instead.1 In a 
continuous time model and under certain conditions, the “bang-bang” equilibrium means 
that the initial investment would be undertaken at an infinite rate in order to reach the 
                                                 
1 Technically, a “bang-bang” solution means that there are discontinuities in the control path. See, for 
instance, Chiang (1992), p.164. 
 4 
demanded level of health immediately and that no investments would be conducted after 
that (in a discrete-time model the interpretation is analogous).
2
 Thus, decreasing returns 
to scale would instead lead to gradual adjustment of actual to desired level of health 
capital. Grossman (2000) argued that the assumption of constant returns to scale was not 
too restrictive (a) since the focus of his model was not on the adjustment process and (b) 
since the assumption of constant returns to scale in the production of gross health 
investment did not impede the analysis of optimal amounts of health capital and health 
investment over the lifecycle – a unique optimum is assured by the marginal-benefit-of-
health curve sloping downward. 
 
However, it is not possible to reject the assumption of gradual adjustment based on 
existing empirical studies; see van Doorslaer (1987), Wagstaff (1993), Bolin et al. (2001b, 
2002a), and Galama et al. (2012) for population-based studies; Bolin and Lindgren (2002) 
for a study on individuals, who suffer from asthma or chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease; and Bolin et al (2005) for a study on overweight and obese individuals. So, the 
empirical evidence seems to be in favour of allowing decreasing returns to scale.   
 
In our exploration of the importance of distinguishing between an individual’s ability to 
produce gross health investments and the individual’s capacity to benefit from those 
investments, we will allow for decreasing returns to scale for the production technology. 
In addition, introducing the concept of capacity to benefit, we will allow for the rate at 
which that unit of investment is transformed into health capital to differ between 
healthier and less healthy individuals.
3
 The rationale for this is the following: even though 
                                                 
2  Ried (1998) noted that an infinite rate of investment is not consistent with equilibrium. 
3 Naturally, this is a simplifying abstraction, since some production of gross health investments depends on 
whether or not the individual is able to perform the actions required. For instance, jogging is not possible if 
the stock of health is too small. However, several measures that can be undertaken in order to enhance 
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those who suffer from a chronic illness may be unable to replicate their production 
process of gross health investments, their ability of transforming gross health 
investments into health capital may be greater due to their low levels of actual health. 
Sick individuals may obviously benefit more than healthy individuals from medication 
and healthcare, and further health improvements may be more difficult to obtain for 
individuals with already high levels of health. 
 
Our model will be presented in the next section. Then, some general implications 
regarding steady state and dynamics of health and health investments will be drawn. 
After that, we will perform more detailed analyses of a health policy that targets health 
goods along specific solution curves, using numerical methods. The models by 
Grossman (1972b) and Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) serve as benchmarks. Conclusions 
and discussion end the paper.  
 
2. The model 
Our model extends the original demand-for-health model (Grossman, 1972a, b) both by 
allowing the health-investment production technology to exhibit decreasing returns to 
scale and by assuming that the capacity to benefit, i.e., the rate at which gross health 
investments will be assimilated into the stock of health depends negatively on the health 
stock.  
 
Preferences  
We consider a version of the demand-for-health model in which time is continuous and 
the individual is the ultimate producer of his or her health. The individual derives utility 
                                                                                                                                            
current health and make future good health more likely can be performed independently of the current 
health state; for instance, choices regarding smoking, drinking, and eating behaviour.     
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from health,  , and consumption,  . Preferences are represented by a quasi-linear and 
additive separable utility function, which is strictly concave in   (     ):
4
 
   ( (    (     (        (      (1) 
where      is a constant. 
 
Ability to produce health investments 
The individual’s investments in the stock of health capital - gross investments, at time  , 
are denoted  (  . For convenience, the technology is formally represented by a 
production function that is homogenous in the quantity of investment, of degree 
 
 
      . Thus, the dual cost-of-gross-investment function is homogenous of degree 
      with respect to the quantity of gross health investment, i.e., the cost of 
producing an additional unit of gross health investments is increasing in the size of the 
investment. The rate at which the marginal cost increases is reflected by the parameter  , 
which is determined by the individual’s ability to transform resources into gross 
investments in health.
5
 The production technology, and other conditions for the 
production of gross health investments, implies a cost-of-gross-investment function, 
which is increasing and convex in the quantity of investment. Formally, the cost of gross 
investment is: 
 ( (     (      (      (2) 
where  (     is the one-unit cost of gross health investment,   is the composite price 
of market goods and services used in the production of gross health investments (health 
                                                 
4 Throughout the paper, a subscript indicates a partial derivative (except when t indicates time 
dependence), while a superscript is used for labelling functions. The exception is time derivatives, for 
which we use the notation  
  
.  
5 This ability is often conceptualised as two different types of productivity: (1) productive efficiency - the ability 
of transforming a given amount of inputs into gross health investments - was discussed by Grossman 
(1972b, 2000), and (2) allocative efficiency - the ability of choosing the best mix of inputs to the production of 
gross health investments - was discussed by Kenkel (1991).  
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goods), and   is the wage rate. The one-unit cost function fulfils the usual cost-function 
properties, in particular, concavity in input prices. Technically, the parameter   reflects 
the efficiency of the production technology with respect to the instantaneous quantity of 
gross health investment.  
 
Capacity to benefit from health investments 
The individual is assumed to have a diminishing capacity to benefit from health 
investments – the larger the actual stock of health capital the smaller the rate at which 
gross health investments are transformed into health capital. The rate at which a certain 
amount of gross health investment is transformed into health capital – the capacity to 
benefit – is given by the function  ( (     , which is strictly decreasing in ( (   . The 
parameter   reflects the rate at which the capacity to benefit diminishes as the stock of 
health increases. Strict convexity of  ( (      would imply that there is no upper limit 
on the health stock, whereas concavity would imply the existence of such a limit (perfect 
health). In both cases, the size of the gross investment needed in order to add further to 
the health stock increases as the health stock grows. When  ( (      is strictly convex, 
the required investment grows at a decreasing rate. More specifically, in the convex case 
we have:    
 (    
  ( (       , and     (     ( (       . Similarly, in the 
concave case, in which the investment required in order to add a unit to the health stock 
grows at an increasing rate, we have:  (      , and  ( ̂  )    ( ̂ is perfect 
health). In both cases, the capacity to benefit is      , and the impact on health 
from the gross investment,   , is  ( (      . Figure 1 shows the graph of the function 
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  in the two cases.   has been specified so that the domain  (    0,5] yields the 
functions range in both cases.6 
 
  Figure 1 about here  
 
The motion of health capital over time 
Gross investments in health are partially offset by natural depreciation of the stock. In 
order to facilitate our analysis, we assume that depreciation of the stock of health capital 
occurs at each point in time at a time-independent rate,   (      .7 The equation 
for the motion of the stock of health capital over time then becomes: 
 
  (  
  
  ( (     (      (     (3) 
Budget constraint 
For simplicity, we assume that there are no financial markets, and that the price of the 
consumption good is 1.
8
 Thus, income equals consumption and investment spending at 
each point in time: 
 (    ( (     ( (   ,  (4) 
where   is full market income, which is a function of wage and healthy time, which, in 
turn, is a function of health capital,  ( (   , which is increasing and strictly concave 
in (  . Thus, potential market income is:  
 (      ( (   ,    (5) 
where  denotes the wage rate.  
                                                 
6 The convex case is specified as        (   and the concave case as             (  
 
.     
in both cases. 
7 In the original formulation of the model (Grossman, 1972a,b) and in several later extensions and 
applications, for instance, Muurinen (1982), Wagstaff (1986), Liljas (1998), Jacobson (2000), and Bolin et al. 
(2001a), the depreciation rate is assumed to increase over the individual’s lifetime. Since we are not 
interested in analysing the effects of ageing in this paper, we follow Forster (2001) in adopting the 
assumption of a time-independent depreciation of health.    
8 This follows in the tradition of Forster (2001), who also assumed that there are no financial markets. 
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The individual’s control problem and optimality conditions 
The intertemporal problem that faces the individual in our model is to choose the time 
path of the health stock so that his or her lifecycle utility is maximised, given that the 
(exogenous) planning horizon is  .9 Future utility is discounted at the rate   and, hence, 
the individual acts as if solving the following optimization problem (omitting function 
arguments): 
     
 (   (  
∫        ( (    ( (     ( (   )   
 
 
  
subject to:   
  (  
  
  ( (     (      (  , 
and the start value  (     . We will consider the vertical-terminal line version of the 
problem, that is, the transversality condition is ( (          (             
10
 
The current value Hamilton function for the maximisation problem is: 
 (    ( (    (     (   ( ( (     (      (    (6)  
The maximum principle provides sufficient conditions for the optimal control of  (  , 
provided that the Hamiltonian is concave in ( (    (   .11 Concavity of the 
Hamiltonian cannot be guaranteed for all (permitted) specifications of the model, since 
 ( (     (   is convex in ( (    (   . Thus, for a specification of the model that 
involves a concave Hamiltonian, the following equation of motion describes the optimal 
time path of the shadow price of health capital (again, arguments are left out for brevity): 
                    
  
  
                     (          (7) 
                                                 
9 We formulate the individual’s optimisation problem as a truncated vertical terminal line problem. This 
means that the terminal time, T, is fixed but the terminal state is free to vary above a certain permissible 
level. This is to be distinguished from a horizontal terminal line problem (see, for instance, Ehrlich and 
Chuma, 1990) in which the terminal state, T, is free and the terminal state is restricted (Chiang, 1992, 
p.182). In the latter case, optimal length of life is, implicitly, determined by the transversality conditions.  
10 See, for instance, Chiang (1992), p183. 
11 This follows from the Mangasarian sufficiency theorem; see, for instance, Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987). 
We show, in the appendix, that the Hamiltonian will be concave for some parametrizations. 
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The first-order condition for the control variable,  , is: 
           (      .    (8) 
It is straightforward to derive the health-stock equilibrium condition, and the condition 
for optimal investments in health (flow condition). Rearranging (7) yields the health-
stock equilibrium condition:  
         (         
  
  
 
)   .  (9) 
This corresponds to the equilibrium condition in Grossman’s original demand-for-health 
model. The differences are (1) the term     , which reflects the impact on the marginal 
cost of health capital induced by the diminishing capability of benefitting from gross 
health investments, and (2) the shadow price of health capital ( ). The absence of capital 
markets means that the inter-temporal allocation of resources is completely achieved 
through the health stock and, hence, that a time derivative of either the shadow price or 
the control variable ( (  ) appears in the stock condition. The equation system (3) and 
(7), where (8) has been used to substitute for the control variable, cannot in general be 
solved explicitly.    
 
3. General implications 
Diminishing productivity in the production of gross health investments, and in the 
capacity to benefit from those investments, influence both optimal time paths and 
steady-state levels of  (   and  (  . The transversality condition, however, will be 
violated in many cases. Thus, steady-state levels may not be relevant in the sense of being 
part of a solution to the dynamic optimization problem.  Nevertheless, the location of 
any steady state(-s) of the system is an essential part of determining the dynamics of the 
system, since an equilibrium is also a demarcation (or reference) point between different 
behaviours of the system dynamics.  
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We summarize our findings regarding the relationship between technology and capacity 
to benefit from gross health investments, respectively, and steady state,      , in the 
following claim: 
Claim 1: (i) the health good price effect on steady state is: 
   
  
  ; 
   
  
   
 (ii) the technology effect on steady state is: 
   
  
  ; 
   
  
  ; 
  (iii) the capacity-to-benefit effect on steady state is: 
   
  
  ; 
   
  
   . 
Proof: The proof is a straightforward comparative static computation. See the appendix. 
 
A comment is called for: an increase in   will decrease the demand for health but also 
decrease the supply of health capital. Thus, a smaller capacity to benefit would mean a 
smaller steady-state health stock but not necessarily a smaller quantity of steady-state 
gross health investments.   
 
Dynamics 
The dynamics of the model outlined above is illustrated in the phase diagram (the I-H 
domain) below.
12
 The model dynamics is given by the following equation system (see the 
appendix):  
  (  
  
    (      (    ( (    (   , and    (10) 
  (  
  
 
 
       
 [ (                  (    
  
 
    (  )]     ( (   .
      (11) 
                                                 
12 State-phase analysis has been widely applied within economics, in order to illustrate the properties of 
dynamic theoretical models; see, for instance, Caputo (2005) for several examples. Within health 
economics this technique has been applied less often, though. Forster (2001) illustrated the qualitative 
properties of a theoretical model, taking adverse and beneficial consumption-induced health effects into 
account, using state-phase analysis.    
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The shape of the null clines for the state and control variable are given by equations (10) 
and (11), above. Let,  (     (                  (    
  
 
    (  ). 
Using  ( (    (    and  ( (   , we show that the health locus has a negative slope 
and the investment loci have positive slopes, if      . Adding the assumption that all 
third-order derivatives are 0 assures that both loci are convex. A steady state,      , is 
defined by the equation system   (          (     ], and is saddle-point stable 
(see the appendix). It follows from (11), that in steady state, it is necessarily true that 
(    
  
 
     )   , which implies (assuming    ) that any health stock for 
which the capacity-to-benefit elasticity with respect to health is larger than   , i.e., 
   
 
 
   , cannot be a steady state. For purpose of illustration, we will assume that 
this condition is fulfilled, that a steady state exists for permissible combinations of 
control and state variables, and that the   -plane is divided into four similarly sized 
quadrants.  
 
The direction of the system in each of these quadrants can be found by computing the 
derivatives    and    (see the appendix), and using the fact that they are 0 at their 
respective null cline.  
  
  Figure 2 about here 
 
The qualitative properties of the model are illustrated in Figure 2, in which individuals 
start at     with the initial health stock,   , or   
 , in one of four possible regions. 
Each region is characterized by the direction of the system in    space. The 
transversality condition ( (          (     is satisfied either for  (        
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or for  (    . We will proceed by assuming  (     and checking whether or not 
the resulting  (   satisfies  (       . If it does, we have found a solution; if not, 
we have to solve the fixed terminal point problem given by the condition  (       . 
We have marked four particular streamlines, A – D, which are candidates for an optimal 
solution. All four are consistent with the maximum principle, but only two of them are 
solutions to our problem – A and B violates the transversality condition which dictates 
that  (    .  
 
The welfare impact of a change (at    ) in the price of health goods and services, 
brought about by altered lifecycle choices, is given by dynamic envelope results (Caputo, 
2005; Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1987). Here, we will calculate (the present value of) the 
change more directly as: 
   (     (    ∫  
   [ ( ̂(       ̂(     )   ( ̂(       ̂(      ]
 
 
     
where  ̂(   and  ̂(   are the optimal time paths of health and consumption. Obviously, 
not only the direction but also the magnitude of the changes induced by a policy matter 
for the prospect for constructing efficient health policies as well as for beneficial 
individual welfare effects. Individual health-production technologies and capacities to 
benefit from health investments (partly) determine individual responses to and welfare 
outcomes of exogenous changes.  
 
4. Numerical computation 
In order to quantify the effects, we need to employ a specific specification and 
parameterization of our model. We proceed by (1) specifying the model, (2) solving the 
model and illustrating the solutions for two specific parameterizations, (3) solving for 
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steady states corresponding to a range of parameterizations, and (4) performing a policy 
experiment. 13 
 
Specification  
The following functional specifications and parameter choices were made:  
(1) Preferences:  ( (    (    (        (  )      (  , where    and    are 
(strictly) positive constants; 
(2) Ability to produce health investment (technology): ( (     (      (   ; 
(3) Capacity to benefit from health investment:  ( (         (  ; 
(4) Budget constraint:  ( (              (   (  is total available time), which 
means that total market income is:  ( (      (          (  ).  
   
The individual’s control problem and optimality conditions revisited 
The current value Hamilton function for the maximisation problem of the specific model 
is (arguments are left out): 
  (             (  (     
               (           )  
Concavity of the Hamiltonian depends on the relative size of the parameters entering the 
function. In particular,   determines the size of the cross-derivative term in the Hessian 
matrix of the Hamilton function and, hence, a small enough   guarantees that   is 
concave in (    . Concavity of   was checked for all the parameterizations that were 
used for numerical analysis. 
 
The following equation of motion of the shadow price of health capital results from the 
specified Hamiltonian (again, arguments are left out for brevity): 
                                                 
13 All calculations were performed using Maple17. 
 15 
   
  
      
                  
          (   
            )   
The first-order condition for the control variable,   , is: 
        
               
     .  
 
Estimation method 
All estimations were carried out using the software Maple 17. The model is solved using 
the Trapezoid method, which is a finite difference method (Judd, 1998). Essentially, this 
means that the time interval is partitioned into a finite number of subintervals, and that 
the differential equations are used to approximate the change in the values of the 
unknown variables associated with each such subinterval. In more detail, the method 
comprises three steps: 
(1) partitioning of the planning interval,     ], into a finite sequence of equally sized 
subintervals,             ], by defining the mesh as   
 
 
 ; 
(2) defining the difference equations for the movement of the state and co-state 
variables (in line with previous denotation, 
  
  
 and    denote the equation of 
motion for the stock of health and the partial derivative of the Hamiltonian with 
respect to the health stock at time  , respectively):          
 
 
 
(
  
   
 
  
     
)  , and            
 
 
(         )  and 
(3) choosing the production of gross health investments so as to maximize the 
Hamiltonian, i.e., choosing    so that            . Adding our knowledge 
about the initial health stock,      
 , and the requirement that the co-state 
variable shall be 0 at    , i.e.,     , sufficient information for the problem 
to be solvable is available. In all calculations we set            and   
    .   
 16 
 
Parameterization 
The following base-case values were assigned to the parameters of the specified 
model:     ;     ;         ;       ;    ;      ;     ;       ; 
      . For these values, the Hamiltonian is concave in (     at all        ]. The 
analysis focused different technologies for the production of health investments and 
capacities to benefit from those investments, parameterized by different combinations of 
       ] and        ].  
 
Figure 3 about here 
Figure 4 about here 
 
Illustration of solutions for two different individuals  
In Figures 3 and 4, we illustrate the solutions paths for two different individuals – both 
characterized by the base-case values (above), the starting value of health capital,     , 
and individual-specific technology and capacity to benefit given by (1)          and 
(2)             The figures illustrate optimal time paths of health capital and gross 
health investments for these cases. The combination of an inefficient technology and 
diminishing capacity to benefit from health investments induce the individual to 
postpone his or her investments until health has fallen below a certain level. Without the 
diminishing capacity to benefit there would have been a more pronounced smoothing-
out of investments over the lifecycle (Erlich and Chuma, 1990).   
 
 
Figure 5 about here 
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Steady state 
Figure 5 illustrates possible steady states as a function of the capacity to benefit from 
health investment for two different health technologies (      and    ). The more 
efficient technology implies larger health stocks and more health investments. The 
specification that we used predicts that a weaker capacity to benefit from health 
investments leads to less health capital and more gross health investments. Moreover, the 
model predicts that the increase in the demand for gross health investments grow more 
rapidly for the relatively efficient technology as the capacity to benefit decline. 
 
Figure 6 about here 
Figure 7 about here 
 
Policy experiments 
We calculated the  -elasticities of  , 
  
  
 
 
 
, associated with different technologies and 
capacities to benefit (   ). The results of the computations are reported in Figures 6 and 
7. In Figure 6, we report the calculated elasticities as a function of  , for three different   
values; in Figure 7, we report the calculated elasticities as a function of  , for three 
different   values. The results in Figure 6 and 7 show that the welfare impact of a price 
change is considerably larger in the case of a poor capacity to benefit from health 
investments (high  ) compared to when the capacity is stronger. Similarly, when 
investment are produced at a fast-increasing marginal cost (high  ), the welfare effect of 
a price change is larger than in the case of less fast increasing marginal cost. The impact 
of the capacity to benefit is larger than the marginal-cost effect. 
 18 
 
 
4. Discussion 
In this paper we extended the demand-for-health model by making a conceptual 
distinction between (1) an individual’s ability to transform time and other resources into 
gross health investments and (2) his or her capacity to benefit from the investment, i.e., 
to transform the investment into an increase in health. We examined the case, in which 
the first part depends on the size of the investment (decreasing returns to scale) and the 
second part depends on the actual stock of health (diminishing capacity to benefit). 
Analytical results concerning the effect of these two features on steady-state levels of 
health and health investments were derived. We showed: (1) that people will hold less 
health capital, ceteris paribus, compared to what would be the case (a) in a pure 
Grossman setting (constant returns to scale and capability to benefit) or (b) in a setting in 
which the individual produces gross health investments using a decreasing returns-to-
scale technology but is not subject to diminishing capacity to benefit (Ehrlich and Chuma 
setting) and (2) that a steady state is saddle-point stable for certain technologies and 
capabilities to benefit from health investments (a sufficient condition for this to be the 
case is that       and that  (   is concave or has the form  (        ,   
 ). 
 
Moreover, the introduction of a capability to benefit from gross health investments that 
diminish with the size of the health stock has implications for the adjustment of the 
health stock from the actual to the demanded amount. Since the effective price of health 
capital increases in the health stock, individuals who are not in steady state will face a 
price of health capital that varies over time due to the changes in the stock itself. More 
specifically, an individual who is on a health-increasing path will face a higher future price 
 19 
of health capital due to the capability-to-benefit effect; the opposite is true if that 
individual is on a health-decreasing time path. These incentives are akin to the incentives 
created by market-price inflation and deflation, which also create incentives for 
reallocation of economic activities over time. The incentives created by the diminishing 
capability to benefit are weakened by decreasing returns to scale in the production of 
gross health investments: when health is on a declining path, the incentive created by the 
diminishing capability to benefit to postpone investments is balanced by the increase in 
production cost of doing so (due to decreasing returns to scale). An analogous argument 
can be made in the case of an increasing health stock. 
 
The analysis of how technology and capacity influences individual responses to a health 
policy that lowers the price of health-care goods was performed using numerical analysis. 
We found that individuals that faces a capacity to benefit from health investments that 
diminishes rapidly are more sensitive to changes in exogenous prices than individuals 
with a capacity that diminishes more slowly, ceteris paribus. Moreover, the effect of 
increasing marginal cost of gross health investments was found to be similar: more 
rapidly increasing marginal costs corresponds to larger responses to a change in 
exogenous prices. The technology effect was found less important than the diminishing 
capacity effect, however. This suggests that the largest total willingness to pay for health 
policies that target prices of health goods and services is found, when an individual is 
characterised by rapidly decreasing returns in the production of gross health investments 
and a rapidly diminishing capacity to benefit from these investments.     
 
 
 
 
 20 
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APPENDIX  
In the appendix, the time argument (   is omitted where convenient. 
Concavity of the Hamiltonian 
The components of the Hessian matrix of the Hamiltonian are: 
             (   (    (     ; 
                (   (     (     , if         
            (    ; 
              ; and 
         (          
The determinant of the Hessian matrix is:               , which is   , if 
     , and         (use    ) which proves that the Hamilton function is 
strictly and jointly concave in the control and state variables in this case.   
 
Steady state 
The qualitative properties of the steady-state loci resulting are depicted by implicit 
differentiation of equations (10) and (11). The slope of both loci are determined by the 
assumptions made so far – the health loci is upward sloping (in the I-H domain) and the 
investment loci is downward sloping. This means that there can be only one steady state 
– a saddle point (this is shown below). The curvature of each loci is determined by the 
properties of the capacity-to-benefit function,  ( (   . The health loci is convex if 
 ( (    is either concave or has the exponential form  (      
    . The investment 
locus has no definite curvature (given the model specification). 
 
The dynamics of health is expressed by equation (3): 
  (  
  
    (      (   
 ( (    (   . As regards the dynamics of gross health investment, begin by taking the 
time derivative of (8), which yields:  ( (      
  
  
   ( (     
  
  
      
  
 ( (   
       
 
  
  
. 
Substitute for 
  
  
  (  , and 
  
  
, using (7), (8) and (3), respectively, gives the following 
expression for  ( (   : 
 ( (     (                  (    
  
 
    ). 
Setting  ( (    (      and  ( (    (       yields the steady-state loci.  
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Partial derivatives of  ( (    (    
The partial-derivate components of  , which will be used below, are:  
          (    
  
 
    )     since (    
  
 
    )    when    .  
            (    
  
 
    )   . 
          (
     
  
     (
   
 
   
  
 
)   )    if      , or if  (   has the 
form:  (          
    (             (                    (
     
  
     (
   
 
   
  
 
)   )  
which is    if      , or if  (   has the form:  (    
    .  
 
       (               (              (                 
 (  
        
  
     
     
  
   
 (       
  
     (
    
 
   
   
 
 
      
  
 
  
   
 
 
     
  
   ), which is     if  (   has the form:  (        , and all third 
order derivatives are 0.  
 
Slope and curvature of the steady-state loci 
For the 
  
  
   loci we have the following expression: 
    
   
 
, which implies 
  
  
 
          
  
  . The curvature is given by: 
   
   
 
 
(                    
  (                  
  
, which is    if      , or if  (   has the 
form:  (        . In order to infer the shape of the 
   
  
    loci we make use of 
the implicit function theorem (and the second equation in system 10): 
  
  
    
  
  
   if 
     , or if  (   has the form:  (    
    . The curvature is given by: 
   
   
 
 
(        
  
  
)       (        
  
  
)
(    
, which is     if      . In our formulation of the 
model this cannot be assured without further assumptions. Thus, the 
  
  
    loci is 
downward sloping and either convex or concave. In the EC formulation, the loci will be 
convex, since       in this case.   
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The determinant of the Jacobian matrix 
It is possible to infer the type of equilibrium by analysing the determinant of the Jacobian 
matrix, and evaluating it at the steady state point. The Jacobian matrix equals:   
(
    
    
). The two components not already calculated are:       , and    
   (          (        
(         
 
   (       
(         
    Thus, the sign of the determinant of the Jacobian 
matrix is negative (|
  
  
|), which proves that a steady state is a saddle-point stable. 
 
General model – Steady-state comparative statics w.r.t  ,   , and   . 
Differentiating the system (10) gives: 
(
    
    
)  (
  
  
  
  
)  (
   
   
)   for the components of the Jacobian matrix, see above.    
The Jacobian determinant is negative, i.e., | |  |
    
    
|   , if      , or if  (   
has the form:  (        .   
Cramers rule gives: (
  
  
  
  
)  (
 
 
|
     
     
|
|
     
     
|
)
 
 
| |
  where  
    (                   (
     
  
     
   
 
    )      
if  (   has the form:  (        ;   
           ,  
            
    (             (                    (
     
  
     (
   
 
   
  
 
)   )  
which is    if      , or if  (   has the form:  (    
    . This shows that: 
  
  
   and 
  
  
   .  
 
The corresponding calculations w.r.t   are straightforward: 
    ; 
   (    
  
 
     )  (      
         (        
      . 
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This shows that that 
  
  
   and 
  
  
  . 
 
A change in   involves the following derivatives: 
          (    
  
 
     )   
    
  
   
  ;  
     0. 
Thus, 
  
   
   and 
  
   
  . 
 
Dynamics 
The direction of the integral curves are given by (arguments omitted): 
           , and    
             
(         
 
  
(         
   if        or if  (   
has the form:  (        .   
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Figure 2. State-phase diagram illustrating the direction of the system for each point in the 
H-I-plane, when the isoclines are convex, and the steady state is a saddle-point 
equilibrium. The vertical terminal line problem implies that     . The two dashed-
dotted curves illustrate possible solutions, while the two dashed curves illustrate paths 
that are not solutions to the problem at hand. The dashed-dotted-dotted line and curve 
are the isocline in the Ehrlich-Chuma case (   ).   
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